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CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN A 
TRIBAL SOCIETY: SWAT DISTRICT, 
NWFP, PAKISTAN 
Charles lindholm 
'"The l'.akhtun is nt\'n ac ~a: except when he h at nr."-P.tluun p1'0l't'rb 
Tm: StTBJF.Cr OF thi paper is the peni tence and pat· 
temed tr.msfonnation of primordia.) political auuauro through his-
t • The claim i~ that contemponry politics in ~ t tes can onJ ~ 
properl • undentood ''ithin a framework of the particular culture ol 
the region. Only by establishing and then utilizin 1udl n (nutla\ork 
an a comprehen he politiCLI analysis be: undmnken. The ample to 
be used to illu trate this approac:h derh~ from nthropological field-
work in the Sh mimiJScbujni Disuict or the .sw. t Valley in rhe P:tkh-
tun North West F1ontier Province (NWFP) of P ld~ta rl in 1070 and 
1971. Swat proved to be particulilrly \"lllunblc: nJ an (' r.mplar for the 
•«i I atructural view o! politics, Jince the: are ha undergone "artling 
political altei tions "'ithin the l:a.st &e\'ent)" car nurin that period, 
wat chrutgro from being a region of .. ordered lutnrch} ' ithout rulers 
to a JM:ll di torship. nd finalJ • within the lut ten can. to an in-
tegrated part of the nation nate or Pailitan. \'ct. despite: these met.a-
morph , there is a certain continuit o! themes and premises that 
mu be peel if modem politial reality in the rq;ion is to be Wldtt-
tood. 
The Pak.hturu of wat are in m ny respects unhke the rema.indtt 
or the PAkluun (or. $ somt pronounce h, ~alhrun) peoples td)O in-
• The IUIMT 1ha &a pul hb cntJtude lO the llmry nm 1'n~Ulfll 
l"cllowlhlp of Columbta UnlvtT~Itf whkh fundfXS hit lield·work In wa1 ln 1~ 
1970. artd ID the U.'- Ikparunmt o! ll tal rh, Education and Wtlfare and tile ~~­
tiona! ence Foundatloll 101' JnDII which 1upponcd Ill• 6dd·won In h1ilwl. 
mainly In Swat, In IW77. 
C 19'19 by rhe Rq;rnu of the ltnh ty Cllllfomla 
I)()(K.4687 J79fOSO.Sl + 21 $00.50 
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lubil 'orthem P.akhtan and Southern f hanistan. These \"llried peo-
ple. \\bo make up the largest tribal group in the "-orld. pan many 
ccoJO!!i I tones and include many life }les. 'onetbel modem 
Pakhtun ~riter ~<~) , -:I:he Pak.htun re like rainSO\\on wheat. "J"he) all 
came up the me da). They are all the same."1 The social ttuctu.ral 
prindplo undcrl)ing Swati politi I.Jc the u.me principles 1hat pro-
.. ide the d)namic throughout the tc.rritOT)' nf tJ1c J•nklllun tribes. An 
under tnnding of the wat Pakhtun goes a long \\'ll) toward on uudu-
&tllndi ng of &.he entiret). 
J'urtltcrmore. as l have argued elsevohcre,l the resemblances be-
tw en the wdaJ order lO the l'illtUJU and dte tructure of lowlomd 
Paki tnni society are far greater than the differences, whic.h are pri-
rnarily in the sale of the hierarchies. I hopt' the SEudent or Pakistani 
politics, as ~ell as rndcnu of o her third ~orld politi , will find some 
explanatory \-alue in the p3ges to foliO\\'. 
Tho Undollylng Structute of the Swat Polity 
The prim2ry f:laor. which must be kept in the forefront o£ an}" 
an 1 "s of J>akhtun politics, is that the 'ety wa nd is organized 
on the ba • of kinship. trictl) p:uriUneal. the funclament:ll concept 
of the aodel} is that aU those rclated through common male ancestor 
abould mnd united against outsiden. Thus, in theor). the fifteen mil-
lion Palhtun of Paki tnn and Afghanistan r.hould be capable of com-
ing u~gcthcr ao light im-:tders. "I his sy11em, whir.h b common world· 
wide :uul i~ knm,"ll technically to anthrorologi t :u :t segmentary 
lineng • S)"em, ·wa~. lll:tjor factor in a he suc-re 'or 1'. khtun resislance 
to colonbl cncro;u:hmcnr. 
When not rhrc. acned by external invasion, the P khcun people 
occtJpietJ thcmsel\el in fi~hting or1c :.~nothcr. Hrothen cornWncd to 
aquabhle and feud l\ith their p:miline:~l m, te fir t cou in : grouP' of 
fint cousins united to fight second cousins. ~h1le who1e line:~ge seg-
ments rrcd .-ith other segments '"E"CT)'Where famil~ is arrayed 
'rut famrl). nd tribe a,gairut tribe. in fa« one way and another 
C\"Ct} m:an"s hand i agairut hU nci hbor ••• but hen dan r threat-
ens from ithouc, all family feuds nd clan jealomia are at once for-
gouen and II unite to repel the oommon enem :-a 
1lle ideal fonn of tlte segment ry line.1ge ) tern occurred in the 
nomadic dans of Pak.htun in Arghani tnn \lihere the egmenu "ere 
&1111111 and mouile and therc(ore e. ily apllt \\hen httC'rnal disputes 
l Ghani Khan, Th~ Patlunu, • Slcetch (rc:sbnu. Unlvrnhf llook Agmcy, 
l9.i }· p. 6'7. 
I ~harlo Undholm, '"Tbto X1tmollllrf Unoge )•tern: Itt Applicability to 
Palduau'a J'olltlatl Suucture,'' ln Ainslie Embrc:c: (rd.), Pd.utnn'a nut&"nJ Bordn-
l.tndl (llurham, ·C.: Caroliru AC24emlc: P1 • 1977). 
IJI, I lint. If Cmernl R~fKnt em th~ fwuf:IJlJ (l.ahon• Covernmeot Preu, 
I : trpt ntcd, Prsh:nnr: ~cd ~ 1977), pp. 20f-!05. 
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ttUpted. But in Sl\at, where nonJads had settled as conquerors in an 
agricultural rq;ion, the utuation be<::ame more complex. In this ca e. 
~t:,"'llent'l were :machcd to a f:mn plot aml opposing elements could 
no longer simply plit off to become a new nomadic band. Enmity 
thus tended to focus strongly on the fathcr'r. brother's son ,,·ho Wil'> 
one's main rh·al for the land of Lbe paternal grandfather and, as such, 
one's neares.t neighbor. The term of rcle1 cnce for this relauve. tarb rJT, 
CJrne to be synonomou in Swat with the term for enem). 
In a more or Jess con~ous mr.empt to offset tl1e di~ruptive soc.ial 
effects of a sedentary economy. the f:mning Pakhtun of Swat followed 
a custom of periodic land rcdrnribution that prcsened many a<>pccu 
of nomadi\m, This redistributive S}.l.tem, calletl wesh, im·ohed the 
e.xchange or o.;ilJages and adjamnt l:tnds among related segments at 
regular intenab, usually every seven or ten yean. Although it has been 
claimed recently tl1at v .. wh wots "a m}thOlOfn• of terriloria.l rightS .•. 
(that) cca.sed to function as a v:iable land tenure aystem unhersally 
sometime early Ja~ot ccntut·y,"4 th•e fact of the matter is that the wesll, 
in Upper Swat at lea~t. functioned belween \'illages until stopped by a 
ruler fifty )Cars ago, and contin1ued to (unnion l\ithin the "ill:tges 
until the very recent past. 1-'lmctionally, tiJt:Jh pte\'ented any .segmem 
of a lineage £1om evolving a permanent base for expansion. Villages 
were regarded simp!) a~ long·tel1Jil campsite$ .soon to be exchan~ for 
another, equally agreeable. 
The aucmpt to maintain a nomadic ocial order by the impo i-
lion oE the wtsh w-as counterbaJanced by ahe real production base of 
lledentary agriculture. An~gonism between tarbur o,·er land o[ the 
common grandfather was :md rern:tin~ an inescapable fact of life. The 
pervasi"e hostility between t.he sons of brothers led to the development 
of a net\\ ork of alliances within every village that divided it acro\S 
lineages into two approximately «~ual p:trties. r.allcd dulla. Every man 
belonged to the tltlllfl oppo~ite that of hi~ tnrbur. This division r:uni-
fied tluoughout the valley, so that all of the near! • one million in-
habitants 'isualiu~d themselves ;as members of one of two etttnall · 
warring par1ies. Subjeotively. the dulla had only one purpose, that is, 
to allow the participant to defe:Jt and destro · hi tarbur. There ll.'a.S 
no ideological roment beyond t.hi , nor wa there a !(!Ose of loyalty to 
the party. Indhidual ea~ily r.hiCted allegi:mcc_~ in respome to the 
maneu"·cn of their torbur and lh~:ir own apprai>al of a part}':; .strength. 
The village p:nay \Ia'! muall)· namell after iu le: ding mem~T or 
after hi., d:10 :ll1CC.Stor. •rttc )eadctr bad lO UC ,1 d\lln~rnatic pt.t.-;Onality 
powerful by vfnuc or hh gcn(:TO.it). lmi\U)o .-nd \·engefulne <. Such 
men gathered a foUowing br their manipulathe ability and personal 
magnetism, but they \\"CI c nevo· reg:uut'd as more that first among 
eqtL'liS b) their fellow lando,mr:n. When the abilities of a leader 
• A. Ahmnl, M•lknlu"' 1md Charilmc •mOll& Pat"-m (l.ondoo: R.outkd~ and 
Kepn P~ul, Hl7G), p. S 
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~ned. OT "hen be died err was l:.illc:d. be '\\"aS r~plac:ed b} another man 
aa1ub e of filling the role "ito was no n nl close ~lathoe of 
tlte old leader. "Funhermore. leaden had oo judicial pm c:r. They Jed 
ll)• au tion and force of personalit~. and could be diwbqtd at any 
time. 
In tltc dnys before the state, SWDt was a aoclety of herOC'.S, baulc:s. 
mur11 e, :md bl•trayal. But the p~l · S)'$tcm and the idoolog;· of eqmll-
hy or all lineage egments did not allow !c>r the e-.olution o£ a central 
()rganiz:uion or tbe de,;elopment of <:omple.>< hiemrchies. P41rties were 
metel conglomerates of equals :and their dependents, \loith a nominal 
le:u'lcnhip, helcl together only by hostility tO\\'lUU their personal ene-
mies. l>espite gloriou~ exploits of ma~ter pia er , the gnme remained 
in •ullemate, c.aught in the immobilizing \~Cb or tltc segmenta.r')' so-
det)'. 
This is not to claim dlllt the indigenous stnaccnrc \1:, sin pttf~ct 
balance. Temporary local \ictories did occur and a d11age pany was 
somedmo forr:cd into exil~. Rut the fruiu ot uch • o,:ictory \1/rtt 
mainly enhanced prestige (or the ,i,tors. A clan could not afford to 
I IU!lf iu membership. cspeciall) at the time of bod redistribution, 
wh n neighboring groups \loOuld opprm anv dan that wn numericallv 
Therdore. tlte defc:atcl part \\'Ould al )'t be im• hed luck to 
the \ill at the lime of wah. Tite segmentary line principle, 
hidt unites kinsmen in the face o£ external danger, uould take 
precedence O\ er part) I0)1lhies. "l1te intcnninable duliD '"ars '~ere not 
fought for m:uc.-rial gain. Rather. the aim 'ms to cstablith the le:ulership 
qualhles o£ [he \\ innn· nnd give them renown. J ntleed .• s one old 
wa1rior said, .. w~r was our houb)'·" 
I lowcu~ r. occnsionally the pride of n exiled p:trly would lead 
them 10 emrlo) :mmhcr stnncgy which w:u potentially fnr more di~ 
turb ng 10 rhe bal:lnce of the tctn . .. The1e hnlic always been two 
p nl in these lawless lands. When one Jlany Welkens, it begins to 
intrigue nth some neig"hborin .. ruler, hopin to induce him to come 
in, oa:upy the counU") and ertable his supporters to rork off their 
' ndctm on their U'Onger opponents. and 50 red the b:ilance of 
power."' In wat, the imen-enin .. third p3r1 as che •a b of Dir, 
m po ~ul kingdom lies to the C:St o{ wat in panallel \'2llq·. 
Jm on b Dtr \\'25 a moti£ that repla)cd mm times in wati 
hbtory. With his anny and aided b · th~ ~e ker wad duliD, Lhe 
'a\\"3b would conquer rh~ t bank of the Sw. 1. Btu \lohcn he at-
tetnptrd tn impose uxes on his n~w subjecu, the Jl~tkbtun of Swat 
,·ould unite gainst him in ac: ord:moc \!ih:h ch ment: ry principle 
of olid thy n~r-tinSL in~adc:n. J"aocd with un nimou opposition. the 
Dir N:twah ' oulll be expelled nod the tlutla ·wnt'1 woulcl begin afresh 
\lolth the pr-estige of the p::uties ngnin cqurtli~<:d. 
I omtx:rx. lktwcm Oxw ead lndw (l.ondoo• llopl.IIlJQil, 1935: re· 
prlotc'd, l.abon: Ai;lUnutL 1976), p. 2C2. 
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Besid~ lhe stare o! Dir, nnother clement w:u acthoe in balancing 
the dulliJS. These \\etC the st4nad4rs. descendants of holy men, who 
., ed as media ton .in local land di5puto, judges t c:esh redistribu-
tion, and guardians of nw'eable propcrt) (or exile Prohibited by 
tl1cir religious heritage {rom uakin :r&Oii\'e p rt in wa.rbre, tht ~lAn11dGr 
mediators v;ere granred siripa of land l)ing between the holdings of 
major segments. Tb.ese uipt. c:~lled Juri. did uot cirruhte at wCJiz, 
m king the stanadnr permanent roidcnu o[ 11 particular "'illage. Due 
1.0 their special role, the stanndor were in • tl excr.Hent position to in-
c:rea~e therr wealth :md property. At <•a• h qcle ol the wuh new land· 
ownens a:rrivccl who did not know the ~xnn extent of stllrzlldar holdin~ 
j n the village, :md t:racts rould be adtlccl 10 Jlanndllr fields by simply 
claiming rhey h:ul :thV3}$ Lcen pArt or the trrri. li L man died in nile, 
hi$ tnO\'C:Jule property was often ~lained by the flLinadaT '"ho 11ad 
been gu3n1ing it. Finall ·• numcrou land granu l\-rtl! C!arrted b) the 
stnn«dttr, both fOT successful mediation in . di pure and as un acr of 
n!!igious merit for rbl! donor. Some 1tana®r thu became ,..-eaithy, 
w..·hile thdr pennan~t antl ~ rcruh:c land ba~ offered an opportunity 
Cor expansion dl!nicd to the Pakhtun landlord!. But this strength w.u 
ofuct b the explicit prohibition agairut sumadm poliucal acthit). 
rt was frotn the class of religious lr-adcn (Pirs). C$pecially !row. 
dluismntic Sufi mendicants\\ ho pTC:IChed immedi:1tc rommunioo \\ith 
the deil)'· that the ~cadership arose uben Swat was confronted b ·a seri· 
OIJS CXIC:nW tlueat. Til.C: lOllS of thae l~de~ ' ere routinized into the 
stcmadar clau. ·rhcy are no( to be conJuK'd with n:ligious teachCTa, 
imams and mullahs, who are d.cpcnd. rttl Cll the Palr.luun and cons.c· 
qucntly their inferiors. R:ttber, the ch.,ri•m:nk Pir nnd hi~ stnnodar 
descendants arc an entirely ~pamte lfluup, quite di~rinct rrom the 
Pak.lnun warriors. 
The ri e of -religion'S ch ri5mtttl in times o£ r.ri i5 en n be under-
stood in the contrxt of l.hc: od J truccure. Segmentary org:uuurion, 
a.s we ha'e u-cn. laded the mechanism for th development of an in· 
tent:tl hicrardt). No Pilkhtun admitted noth~r hi~ .sup«ior. Row· 
el'CT, a m2n of God, ~bo ' outside the mundane art"na of polh.ia 
and kt'd Joya.h not to hhnsclr. but to llal1, w:u a different matter. 
Ont a m:m of thi SOil "11$ able to act as a r~w for p li.htun rcistance. 
Th leaders rose to great hdghts during im:wom, but bdcd t\ith 
&he (:css3UOn o£ hostilities. TJu: trUCtUl'C dicl 001 nt."L"d a center if there 
wa.. no ongoing c:riill.. 
1 u complete Lhe picture of tho trunural romponents of the Swati 
,-.olity. the chw :w.d ouupAtion:al dhjsions mtut also be included. 
lkneath the Pakhruo Jandholdct'l were the l:muless. Within this group, 
which usually made up onc·thircl tu onc·lull of :my \illage. wete the 
fnrm lahorcn (fnkir) and the \'ill:tg ~pedali rs, such as the barber 
(nai), lenthen~orker (JizaMchtl), :UI(! so Dll, .-\1 o inr.lurled were th!.l 
hill rlwclling Gujflr people. pc.1king their own langllage a11d p;1)iog 
:l t:.JX in lnbor and goods ro their J1 klman or &tanadar landlord.>. 
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1l!e fl;~khmn themselves~ di\ided. Allbaugh 1he term P:~khmn 
properly appli~ to :~II landholders relatetl p:urilineally, it iJ in fact 
u5ed primaril~ to refer to Lh~ \H>aker linea ~. P~Uuun m~ whose 
f:unilio are po"erflll. ~·ho ha''e inwtrious ncc:stors, and 111ho hold 
large amounts or land relati-r~ to the rest of the \ill:tgcn 'ar~ caliM 
Khan. The J>akhruns r~y on the Kl!an (amil in 1he ncighborhood for 
protection and, in rewm, offer defc.renr.c nnd loynlty. Tite Palhtun i~ 
ron \ler-ctl a p~trt or the tul, or faction, of hi Klann, nnd "-ru formerly 
t·JCpectt.'tl tn light on his behalf. The picture. TioWcH:r, &hould not be 
'iewed ns one of trongly den"foped hier.uch)'• ·Fully h tl£ the land-
llolth-r~ in il 'illage m:1y be stylro 1\fuw. 
1lw l!pcdAiiSLt, the fakir, and the riujar, '' ho do uot ha'Ve ilfl) 
1 ights to hud irtrt: they are not lineal rcl:.li1r'C3 to the Palthtun, were 
grant<.'tl a share in tul land or produr.e ns p:.pncnt for their services. 
Most or thr:m \\Caked for the: same till for e\Cntl generations. The 
1\htm fan•ily o£ the tul gave them houso, a,Jjutlioited their di~putes, 
IUTilnged their manU.ges, helped them in their feuds and. in general. 
acted out the obligations of a patron. Jn rt:<:ompensc, the iandles,; "·ere 
obligro to fight for lhcir tul. gl\'e t11rir Klaan :a fcc ror ~-cry marriage 
and I of C\tt)' .11nimal :sJaughtert'd, alii well as suppl) con'tC b.bor 
on denund. The Khan held great pcrnn O\'er tlu: landlos :md over the 
Jl()()rcr Pakl11un, so much q) that it ''-:u common for him to l.ll.ke ahe 
more :utrac1hc wives and daunhtcn of his dcpcm1 nu :u hh mistre55e5. 
h i cvid.enl, UICll, that, in <~.pitt: or th(' cg;~liutrian ideology or tlle 
St'gmcnlltll' &OCiety, ~odaJ realit} was hanlly \\ithout tliuinctioru of 
rank. Thr. }Q~e, le'l:el P.akhtun. who h;•d litalc l:tncl, hccnme retainers 
for the Klrtfll, wltHe the land!~~ were hi~ ottl1lght auhjects, This aT· 
rilnscmtmt tlcrivcrl from Swat's history. The YIHil/Zili dan, who ron-
querr.d S\liat (i,·e hundral years ago, made up the d,t,.'i o( KIUJil'!> and 
PaUuun: the clepencb.nl\ '~ho accomp:wi,~d them romhined with the 
defe ted loc:nls to constitute lhe category of the lrtntlless. Pakhwn who 
lost 1heir I m.l ol.a fell into the latter j;'Toup. Within the Yu.sujzai 
thonseh hierarchintion occurecl to limited e,.;tent beanue o£ the 
agricuhur:d economic b:lie, which alJo,.,ed stronger bmilie3 to extort 
land from ~-aker cowins. thw fonning tbe mall·holder and Khan 
da 'l brre is an obvious analog) ben: to mediC\111 Europe. Tbe 
Khan rocmblt:!l the feudal Lord; his sru.all holder relui\-es are li.kt 
the l..nrd'a :reuinen. "\\hUe the landlesi are imilar to the ,--.rious types 
of ~oerf. llowc,;r.r, despite superficial cotTC'Spondeneo, then: is :t major 
d.irfcrcna:. Within rhe Sv.;ati system t.hl!rc ""ns no concept of a c.entnl 
-:nuhorhy. no '~idl'r lop.ILies be)ond the Khau and hb WI. 
Swat Becomes A State 
In 1his s<"crion we observe the tramfonn.uion of rhe pristine poli-
lial ~)'Siena tlfld~r tile stren of colonial hHru~iott. l'he Uritish first 
intcn~nctl directly in Swat during the Ambel aamp:tign of 186!, 
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which ended in victory for i.hc Swati armies, Jed by the great Sufi Pir, 
Saidu Baba. At this lime, the leading Klums, fearlul of another British 
auack, a&ked Saidu Baba to become tlle ruler o£ Swat but, mindful of 
his ecclesiastical role, he refused. 
Instead of trying to retain lhe ephemeral post of ruler, Saidu Baba 
busied himself instead in accumulating huge Lracts o( land and ac-
quiring numerou~ dependents and followers. His family soon became 
one of the most powerful in teTlll .. of resourc;es in all of Lower Swat. 
At the same time. over t.he space or two generations. the family SCCU· 
lari£ed itself and began acth•e paTticipation in the political 6dd. Their 
position as outsiders in the segmenlary system, combined with a charis-
matic history and a permanent base, gave Saidu Baba's descendants a 
great advant:Jge in Lbe political gnme. 
Meanwbilc, the need for a leader against the British was again 
imperative. In 1895 the colonial [orces had occupied the Malakand 
region just south o£ Swat, and had managed to withstand a Pakhtun 
attack in 1 8!}7 led by a mystic who claimed miraculous powers against 
the infidel. Furtltermorc, the British had purchased the loyalty of the 
Dir Nawab who, as a result, bad a stronger anny than ever befor~. Ex-
hausted by the cfforr of maintaining order Lhroughout this unruly 
section of the frontier, rhe British relied on Dir to resO'ain the Sw:uis. 
\'\fhen the Dir Nawab was invir:ed by a weak dulltz to invade Swat in 
1908, the Kham suddenly found th:tt the Dirnrmy could no longer be 
expelled with rclaLhc ease. It took a supreme clforr (or Lhe Swat 
Pakhtun finally LO dere:tt Lhe Nawa.b. who promised to return soon, 
with or without the traditionnl invit:ttion. Faced with this t.h:rcat, a 
council (jirga) o£ Khans met in 1915 and, after much dispute, gave t.he 
title o{ Badsbah (ruler) to Miangul Abdul Wadud, the sole dr:srendant 
or Saidu Baba left ali\' e. lie himself had killed his tWO patrilineal first 
cousins (tarbur), while hi~ only brother had died in the Dir war. 
The Badshah, ,.,.ell schooled in intrigue and warfare, :md with 
S·wat uni red behind him, managed to de fur dcdsivel)' the next inva· 
sion by the Nawab. But the Pakhtum now found an internally evolved 
ruler was more difficult to depose than one imposed from without. 
The Badshah. recogni1ing the historical we:tkness o£ his position, made 
it: his busine~ to ~tabl.i~h an alliance wid"t the British, who were happy 
to have :1 friendly flgure with whom to negotiate in the troubled valley 
of Swat. With lhithh backing. the B:td5.hah w:u in an imp&tgnable 
position. Using his role as jtu.lge and arbitrator. he followed a con-
sisLent polig· o£ favoring the weaker party in any dispute and of con-
fiscating the lands of dissident Khans and !ragmendng their followers. 
The Bad~halt also made a point o£ stopping the wcsll, thus depriving 
t11e other .$tanadar of their mediating role at redistribution. Further-
more, he banished all mendicant Sufis from his realm, thereby elimi-
nating the \err class £rom ·which he him.sdf arost'. British a.id allowed 
him to build ro;~ds and control weaponry, increa!ilng his iron grip on 
SwaL 
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The most intransigent area of SW':lt Shamluif bujru in the 
'onh. Here the Klum had large pdvate armi of outl:n .. -s. great 
personal durism:a and pride, and close ti w'llh D1r. Tite B d.shah 
feared llut his policy of favoring a weal tul in this region might lead 
to an upri ing. Instead, he began b) upporting the r r1 of the Pinda 
t..hr::l. one of the tw~ strong p:trti in the Dimica. This p rt), ho .... ·. 
C\tt, nw hseH as 1he equal or the lbd!hah. and oon began Dtt eking 
che go\ernment tax aravans. The Bad hah th n aJiicd him rolf "'ilh 
the other po"'mul party, that ol the Mahmat khel, and tlro\e the 
Pinda khel into exile in Dir, where they r~1ucstc:d the intenention of 
th Dlr Nnwab. But this ll"aditional plea came to nothing: the alliance 
bcn\cen the Uritlsh :and the 11-'ldshah prc,ented the Nnwnb from act· 
ing. \\'jth l>ir renrlered impotent, the Pjnda l:.hel were forced to admit 
dclcat, nd thdr leaders w~ jailed. 
Hut in dc:fc:aung one party the B dshllh h d gained a d ngerous 
:all . 11te balance of po\\er in t.hc 'obtilc rq.:lon hlld now been upset. 
and tf1e lahmat khel \liel"e regn.1nt. l.ike their oppo hcs lhe Pinda 
khr:l. the fahm:u khel had no .sense of lo)alty to the Badshah and 
considered him •n upstarL The Badshah kept up fdendl relatioru 
with t~ bhmat lhcl. ignoring the throt their power and attitudt 
ofiered co his throne. Then, in J926, the lahmar khel I der was in-
ited to ttcnd a hunting part)' with the n:admah. Durin the course 
of this part), he \\llS r.hot d~d. ·Jlte Badshah's mt) :immedi:uely at· 
tacked the leaderless Malunat .. bel, di nned them, nd dro\C them 
into exile in Dir. 
Now rlant rhe t1tio powerful parti~ of h:antbruf clmjni had been 
IJroken, tlae Radshah w 11 hce to marne hi own m:tn w the pon of 
mt~lill (J.-adtr) of the region. This man, Kh.m 1\ ulhu1, lot mcrl) of the 
Pincll1 khd party, '1\'as a wily and inteJiigi'llt ploucr who hnd gained a 
n.tme b bctra)·ing his father's brother n<.l who h:td anertly supported 
ihe B:ulshah for 10me time. Yet, though hero b the R ct halt's will, 
tun n dhur was hardly a puppet. The ~lements of the defeated 
parties till so po~erful that a strong internal force ro needed 
to control them. In exchange !or peace and AeCUrit , the Barubah ga'~ 
•Jtan n dhur. free hand and his unconditional upport. thus allow-
in the con.suuaion o( hat • in caca. a ,, te "'ithin a state in 
Upper S 1, just u wat itself existed :u a ~nte tlltc within the 
British Raj. 
"11u: 11: dshah ~t':ls not satislicd "ith the cxi ten e of a pol\erful 
lt:J rate at u:: 1\ithin his boundari But plot5 to replace Khan lhdhur 
with ll more malle ble underling foundercct on the fact thnt all tho~e 
' ligtble 10 take Kh3n Uadhur·s place held grudges g tn t the Badshah. 
z Ia t whkh Khan Bndhur kept conlinuall) in the ruler's sight. Khan 
Undhur, though omnipotent in his own III<': 1, h cJ ~10 ambitions to 
o'erthrow the nawhah, and the two states coe i ted in an uneasy 
truce. I han R:adhur acted as a buffer between the ruler and the abra-
lh'e nnd contentious Khans of Upper 11i'at. He monopolittd all com-
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munication channels to the Bad!shah and terrorized rhe Paldmm whb 
his violence, arbitrary judgements, and land appropriation10, "The 
Ruler can never displace me," Khan ~adhur is quoted as $a.ying. "I 
am his protection. I take the blame (or all his Cl\lelty." 
Within ShamizaifSebuj.ni. Khan Badhur emulated the Badshah'ls 
policy of favoring the weaker faction in every village and breaking 
potential leaders . He developed a cQt~rie of faithful followers whom 
he rewarded with power and weall.h in their own anas. One of the 
most prominent of these was FaJa Qoos Khan, who became Khan 
Bad.hur's second in command. 
The position was thus as follows: the party o£ Khan Badhur and 
his ally, Fala Qoos Khan, wit.h the support of the Bad.shah. w.u com-
pletely dominant in Upper Swat; btu the Mahmat khcl party, though 
in exile, continued to hold its la:nd and the loyalties of it.s dependants. 
The dulla system had not been superseded; rather, one dulla, sup-
ported by external force, had assumed what was to be temporary 
asccodance. 
Integration Into Pakistan 
In 1926 tbe British Government officially sanctioned the Bad-
shah's Tule by giving him the title or 'Vali of S\\7:lt ;'lnd gr:mting him 
an official subsidy. In 1949, the old Badshah abdicated in favor of his 
eldest son. Two years previously, Swat had acreded to Palti,ran. but 
retained full internal autonomy. During Ayub Khan'.s presidency in 
Pakistan (1958-1969), great favor Wil$ shown to the Swati roy;~! family. 
Two of A)•Ub's daughter~ were married to sons of the Wali and, in 
1966, President Ayub declared that the Wali was henceforth to be ad .. 
dr~sed as "Highness" and given a fifteen gun salute at all official occa· 
sions. The Wali and hh family. l1owever. were soon to fall !rom Lliis 
pinnacle. Tied closely to the rule of Ayub. the Swati royal family were 
associated with A)iub when he was depo!ted in 1969. Popular reaction 
against the royal states Ayub had bvored led to the fulJ incorporotion 
of the principalitjes of Swat, Dir, Chitral, and Amb into the nation 
as pans of Lhe nC\\'ly formed M:tlakand agency. The Wali was pen· 
sioned off and a DepuLy Commis~ioner took hU place. rhe .B:tdsha.h's 
dynasty had lasted only two generation~ 
Pf('ct'eding the fall of the \Vali, Khan Badhur had al~o met with 
defeat. His conqueror came from within hi5 own party and WM, in 
fact, the son of his cJo~~t ally, Fala Qoos Khan. Betrayal by an :1Uy's 
son i5 :1 recurrent theme in Swali politics and can usually be e.~plained 
as an exum~ion of tarburwali, the enmity of male patrilineal first cou-
sim. Just a5 Khan R:tdhur himself had betr-o~)ed h.i paternal uncle in 
all)'ing with the Badshah, riO Fa Ia Qoos Khan's son. Nisar Khan. be-
trayed Khan Badhur, who had been the symbolic brother o( his father. 
If the nephew traditionally hated his !ather's brother, so the 
!ather's brol.her reciprocated tlus hatred, well knowing that the sons 
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of his brother will be the enemies o£ his m.-n 40ns. Khan Badhur uho 
hated and !eatM the wm of his ally, Fal Qoos han. After the death 
of hiJ old =ill). Klcm Badhur mO\"cl against hi mon promWng son. 
'i r Khan. lie spre d the mmor llut Nisar Khan had acted as a 
<:OW:Ud during the fighting in Kashmir in 19~8. The Wali was pre-
11ilcd upon to di mi the )OUng man from the wati army in dhgncr. 
Ni r Khan towed re\enge ag:~inM hh father' benefactor. The 
mual method or vengeance in Swut i$ 4lss:l5Jination, UUI Nis:tr Khan 
elected to follow a more modem technique. Leaving Swat, he joined 
the Pakhtanf military college at CampbcUpur where he dedicated 
lumscU to his stud ies \\ith the idea of retumiug to his homeland and 
humili ting Khan lladhur. His hanl work and ability allowed him to 
reach the pon of Major in the elite Ail Force. Jn thi role. he wns able 
to approach the Wali directly as an emi s:ary or the \\orld ouuide S ·at, 
O\"etstcpplng 'he obnrunions and plot.s or hi.s entm). 
On hb.,hits to ppcr Swat, Nisar Klan carried out a aubrle am-
p ign to gain foll011ers. A\oiding ghing ny impr don or seeking 
power (or hirrud!. 1 "isar Khan imte:Ld appro clrcd Khan Badhur's 
J>Otential enemies within his own p rty, telling them he rould support 
chon in n au~ptto o\erthrow the aging l nnt. 'i r Kh n a\oidcd 
the labmat ~1. fe2ring an • alliance ;ith them would lead to his 
ubmemon itlun their dulltJ. Khan Badhur's men began to Jook to 
bar Khan a di interested leader who a:mld rescue them from the 
degrading control or the Wali. Nisar Klum himscH "' s able to plot 
wuh rclativ impunity, since his power base was in his position in the 
narlonn l state and rherefore notau~ceprible co Khan H:ulllllr's manenY-
cu, 
AI rhc artme lime, isar Khan wa1 auo visiting the W.di. The 
1\\0 men diw:u 'It'd ~rnuegy in the aolitude of rhe palace priv}. Nisar 
Khan, H a modern nd educated man, seemed unlikely lo l>e plotting 
rm om te n:venge on lhe ruling f:lmily ror ra.st \\TOn::rs rul his lutn:d 
Cor Ktuln Badhur was known. 'I"he WaJi was therefore inclined to 
trust him as a conspirator. The mler decided to follow NiSM Klwl':i 
advicr that ghing Khom lua-athe jobs in the "-ati S0'"Cmmcnt 
burouaacy would soon eliminate thou hts of an \-endetta. As soon 
the .Com of the oppressed families of Upper wat "-ere admitted 
htto lhe dmini tntion. Khan lbdhur's Slran Iebold on communica-
tions w1u broken. This \\M the signal that Khan Uadhur'• enemies lud 
long waited. 
1 he \\' Ji then proclaimed Nisar Kbun .s he:u1 of a r.cond dulla 
In lJp;)Ct Swttt. All the tul leaders were brought 10 n open field to 
dcc:ide \\hicl• dulln \\ould pro..-ide lcnde:rship. Ni r Kh. n's party was 
\ictnriml5, and Rhan B dhur' furious follc•\\trs \'OClt hcatcn h)' the 
riOe hulls oC the Swati :mny. Thus, Khan Bndhur \\IU outwitted by his 
p tron and the 1011 o! his closest ully and d f~tcd h r O\cr thirty 
)Clr in power. The )e:tr wru 1!)59. In fhe ye n, Kh n n dhur "'"2S 
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dead. In ten years, the Pakistani G-overnment acted to depose the 'Vali 
himself. 
Despite his ''ictory over Khan Badhur, Nisar Khan found himsd£ 
incapable of dominating t11e region. "'While his power base in the na-
tional state allowed him to fight Khan Badhur successfully, it also pre-
vented him !rom devoting all his time to the necessary work. of con-
solidating his victory. He rejected the possibilicy of joining the Mahnut 
k.bel and tried instead to follow Khan Badhur's example and relied nn 
the \Vali's support. But, unlike hls predecessor, Nisar Khan was unable 
to place himself constantly between the Wali and his constituency. By 
following Nisar Khan's advice and hiring some Pak.htun from Sharni-
za..ijSebujni for his bureaucracy, the Wall now felt he had hio; own party 
in Swat and no longer .bad need for a middle man. After Khan Radhur' 
death, the \Vali wa~ not inclined to give too much aid to his succ~~<;or. 
Rather, he preferred the situation in Upper Swat to remain <:onfused, 
with none of the contenders for power C\'Cr becoming dominant. He 
even acted co minimize law suits against Khan Badhur's heirs, allow-
ing them to retain a portion of their father's power base. By thus 
diJI'using authority in the region, t.he ' '\Tali hoped to keep the upper 
h<tnd for him.sei(. 
Nisar Khan, having failed to ger adequate bacKing from the 1Vali. 
followed bjs tried technique o£ seeking a solnrion outside Swat. He 
migrated to Saudi Ambia, where he hoped to accumulate enough 
money to overwhelm his opponents. However, he died in 1974 before 
his plan could succee(l .. 
Wilh the failure o£ Ni~ar Khan to take power and lhc downfall of 
the \\Tali, the fortunes of the Mahmat k.hcl party took an enormous 
up~ wing. This part). exiled by the lbd~hah after the death of tht•ir 
leader, had rernained in exile unlil19!J9. That year, wt.-aried of banish· 
mcnt, they l>Cnt a council to the ruler offedng submission. The .Badshah 
was anxious to have a force in ShanuJ.ai/Sebujni as a potential counrcr 
to Khan Badhur and so accepted their petition. However, he ~Lill 
mhtrusted the )fahmat khel and !eared they would seck. vengea.n~e. 
A<.-cordingly. they were phced under SC\'Cre restrictions. No weapon'< 
wc:re allowed them. specialists were kept. (rom their Yillngcs, and (nkir 
were warned wa)'. But, although the Mahmat khel were not given. 
access to weapom and were humbled by being kept in a state or O';tra-
ci..sm, their lands were not confiscated. The Badshah wistlcd to keep the 
Mahm:ll khel base imact to prevem Khan lladhur rrom lOtdlly domi-
nating the region. Because of their pre\·ious srrength, the MahmaL 
khel controlled a great deal of land in Upper Swar. The rental from 
lhese lands gave t.he clan a large c:llih and produ('e ~urphl$ which they 
usctl for two purpo~e~. First, ~incc the Bad~hah had stopped the tl.~o:J/11 
land was now available for purchase. The 1\f;lhmat kh('l made the most 
of this opportunity :mrl bought a~ much land a.~ tlley could afford. 
further incrca~ing their resource base as well as multiplying the number 
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of thclr depernbnu, linte the l nd ~ pa.rccllc:d out to tenant fakiT. 
Scclond, they entmained lavishly in their men'& houses (hujera) in th~ 
style of the old Klttzns, using tlacir urplw to (ccd hundreds of men 
and buDding up a auhe of 10)111 followen. 
'1 he Mahmat U~e:l tratttn• of :refraining Erom open warfare witll 
dle B:uhhah nd p:nic:ntly inc~asing !.heir bue in land and men 
pro\-ed to be • pect.aculu, lltough rransitory, success. ~isar Khan and 
<the Wati d fe.ttc:d Khan 8atUaur. and Lhm lht: Wali hinuelf was de-
posed by the PakistAni CO\-cmment bile ~isar Khan ' ent into \ol-
untary• exile in Saudi Arabi . The fldd ldt to the fahmat lhel. 
Their atre~ was lonnall acknowledged ~hen Feteh foh2mmad 
Khan, Khan B dhur's eldest son and the Ioder of the remnants o! 
the old man's (oJJowcn. annouru:cd he aboli hin his (ather's dulll: 
and joining the fahm:at khel as a subordinate. In this ."a), he threw 
himself on the mercy o! his f4Dlily'a old enemies, who t~"Cre obligal b) 
the l'aUuun code or honor to accept his allegiance. The remainder o£ 
Khan ll dhur's old pany, "'ho hAd ddtcted to folio~ Nisar Kh n. 
renuin I loyal to the Wali, who emerged afler his dbmissal a~ the 
leader or his o~n p:arty in pper Swat. From being weak rh-al~ o( 
Khan Badhur, theM hm:u kheJ auddenl round tltemschcs contending 
with thr dethroned W Ji hirnself for domination or Upper '1\'lll and. 
pertmps. or the entire \-:tlley. The political game, lont; monopolized 
by the WaH and hu p rtner, Kh:an n dhur, w s 11oide open once ag:Un. 
The "'Orklngs o( the &) tern can bot be 6Cen .in the national dec· 
tiona o{ 1970. We llll\ een that the ruuionAl SO'crnment pla)ed a 
vital pan in allowing the old tJulla org.anir:uion to I"C:l sert itself, first 
by giving Niur Khan 11 power l111~ outside of the Swnti polit ira) :trena 
{rom which to attack Khan Uadt111r anrl then by dethroning the Wali. 
1 he c.cntralitation genc:ratcd by r.olonial pressure was abolished by 
the praclices of the Pakistani atlllc and t he anrient pa11c1 n, suppressed 
by the. l)ranny of the Wllli and Kh n B:adhur, rcappe:tred. llut there 
was a nujor difkrcnce. In the days bdou~ the :state. the ttugglc be-
twttn p nia tud been purely IO<. I fight alwa) ending in talemate. 
nut the atakes had been changed with the delelopmem of a nation-
stare. The ~-innen of local c.ontests now would hold n position withiu 
a higtu:r IC\rel organiz.adon th t h d a demonstrated JlO''er to unmalr.e 
a ruler. 1'he not.iun of poliua a a nC\ r-ending game ror prestige WiLS 
now no JonF :appli blc. With the Did of the state, tl1e Clontestants 
dreamed not mctcly of rc:dr in,g the balance of power but rather or 
total victory, of beeoming the new n d.s.lt:th. 
The parties grouped :Jn 1970 on dullo Jines \\ith ideology :~ negli-
gible futor. ·rhe main putics :u-e both rq;ion list and ethnocentric, 
offering the andid tel the hope o£ perhaps ~inirtg l\\'8)' O'lier the 
whOle NWFP. "J"he • timul A" ami Party (1' P) was the pany of tbr 
M hm:u Ulel dulla, hUe the Wati aupported the hulim l.ngue 
1L). The conteW were cxtrmtcly dme and ended in a aplit decision. 
The dahmat t.he1 candidate h)hammad A(ul Khan on a narrow 
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¥ictory in the na: ror ahe Pro\indal Assembly, '~hile ~ "':.li"• son 
Aurang7rb W4~ the \\inucr in a he tion;~l A~bly racr. 
Se'\-enl minor canclidato also ofTerr:d themselves, but gained little 
mpport. One was thc}oungot brother of Xi1ar Khan,Dost Moh:unm:td 
Khan, who ran on the Jl.tli tan Pt'opt~·, Pnny (PPP) aidet. Dost 
fohammad rclused ro ~uppou idlCT che Mahm:u khe1, ,.,ho v.~ ole.! 
rnemies of hf'l Iamil), or the Wali, who hurl dri,~n Nis.lr Khan into 
exile by rrrusing to give him a<k,Ju:ate aupport. The other Kh:ua of 
Swat abu~ Dost .Moh:nnm:td Kh:an for his po~ition and asked hian 
to join a dt(lla, but l1e paoudly 1t'has.t'ct !lnd wn~ b:.dTy defe-Jttd .in th 
elections. 
W'ith the 'ktol ics o£ the m ir1 p.trriei. Dost Mohammad Khan' 
polition seemed particulnJIV quillotir.. J\fter the elet:tion~. it ;tppearcd 
that tlle Mahmal l;hel lwei been t'Spccially fortunate in their c.boice of 
p;uty. The ~AP dotninat.ed the NW:FP and frat Khan mctcori lly 
rose Lo become Presidrm of rhe •Al' in ahe entire r-..'1\'FP. From tl e 
J~<:tt)' politics of harnizaiJ ebujni, the r. hm t khcl were suddenly 
contoting forth~ m:uu:r o£ 'he ""hole North '"~t Frontier Provino:! 
TradJilon end TransformaJlon 
The aspirations of the fahmat l.:h~J Wf'Tt" dealt :an UllUpe!led 
and au~hing blow in 1973, "hen the nationally a~ccndant PPP jailrd 
Afr:tl Khan and th!! NAP learler,hip. This new inl.m'ention from the 
n:uion:ll go,·emment led to a r:nlical r~:~uming or alliances in the Dis-
trict as Dost Mohamm:1d Khan gninrd a.hnapt prom.inance ;a~ the wle 
repreo;ent:uive o[ the Prr iu Upper Sw. T • 
.Although Dost ;\loham111ad Kh:tr\ WI!! quite a yolmg man and rhe 
repr~ent.uhe of the "progrc.uhc" p:art)', he wns not radical or "mod· 
cn1" in his outlook, despite hi use or rrP rhetoric. Uncclurnted, he 
auernpted to emullltc llae lifest)le or the JIJ Khans r.tther than pro-
j«ting a more up-to-date: image. 1 his at}le in~ol\'ed !iring in a men's 
house (' :1} unusual among modern "DUng men). dispensi n~ hospitalit 
on D large scale, and granting patronage: to his follcn\~. In this w v 
he hoped to nin 'I ~ of adhe:renu uc.h u the Ar:ahmat kh~l had 
al~dy aa:umulated through their ~nerosity . .Ac:cna LO the national 
gO\~mmem was ~cd as a source of rutroruage that "·ould bind his 
clienu ao him. 
Wiili the jailing o[ Mohammad Arval Khan and tbP. e.lcllliltion of 
Dent Mohammad Khan, l~cteh Mohammad Khan (Khan Badhur' ~n) 
dcddect ro hilt biro alli:m«'S. With the fall or his f:nh~. he b:ul been 
forrt'.fl, for his O\\ n protection, to sulx"lrdiuaae hims...lC ·o the Mnhmu 
khrl :znd ro suppon Mohnmmac! J\ (r~l Khnn nnd th~ NAP. Hi• int('f· 
e't~ httC! been putcl) PnlL~n:uk, nor hlc~tllogk:al, and he h;.td no !ClUe 
of Joyalry to 'the NAP or to LJ•c: f:thm:H J.;hcl. On the other hand, tJ1e 
nc\\' dulta o£ Dosa Mohanun:ut Kru n hnd been raised by the fiat of the 
Paki tnni C..QvernmenL It had no trong power halt' "" ich.i.n Swat iuclr, 
l 
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thou h I) t Moh:ammad ·as l\ork.ing bud lO de\-dop a follO\\ing. 
Fetdt Mohammad saw that by joining his own pol\crful local consti· 
wency to the rna tiona I connecciom of D l olummad he could escape 
his subordinate role and •~pire to the podtion of I dership ontt held 
b) hb father, Khan Badhur. Furthermore, joining Dost Mohammad 
had a ttrtatn historical urgency in that it ·ould mean the reunification 
of Khan B dhur's old dulltt1 whiCh had httn plit b Do t folammad's 
elder brother, Nisar Khan. Once again, the r millcs of Khan Badhur 
nd ~o·nla Qoe» Khan '\liould ~ alliN, as the)' had be n in the \Iars o£ 
the Blld hnh. Forth~ rea~on then, Fcteh Mohammad Kh:m, the heir 
of an autocnt ~and one of the large.~t landowners in wat. tlcdared his 
lo)-alty to the p::ucy of the poor. Rut il would he more rorre<t to ~ay 
that h~ dcclarell him elf and hi\ party to llc ag:lhl\t the 1\fnhmat kbel. 
Th~ M tun n khel them~ves h<td suffered o •e,ere blow in the 
lo of MohamiD.ld Afzal Khan, au edu ted nncl n:nion:ally respected 
ftgUre. hut they quickly regroupe-d behind hal Khan•s elder brother, 
lotwnrruul Abm Khan. Like the PPP leaden, lam ~han had little 
formal eduaulon. but he understood the traditional political 1\orld 
or the jirga and the men' house. His put) h d n lkl\-antnge m·er that 
of Fetch fohammad and Don fohamrnad in dt:n it had rte\tt sur. 
Cered a pliL Unified by 6lt} )'Qn of continuous trut;gle against more 
po'l\"tt(ul opponents, lhe falunat khcl preJented wlid front. un-
sulliro by int rrul treachery. Ho\IOe\'CI', the new power or the Mahmat 
khcl in the post·Ayub Khan rcrlod, though lhortli\ed, had begun to 
m kc inro Is imo their solidarit). Tl\O oaf th ir )OUngcr members, 
djsmi55ed as "insane," open!} allied thcnlM:hCS '\ith Dost fohammad. 
1 he Wnli's family h:td also been greatly effected lly the ri e of the 
I-PI'. 'I he fuslim League, which was the p:u tV or rhc Wali, had not 
proven itself trong provincially, bandi pped pcrhap by its aged 
lendenhip. In tead, the NAP had pro\idcd tlte m in opposition to 
the PPP. 1-:,-en with the disbanding o£ the 'J\P, the 11. "'35 incapable 
o{ tepping in to fill the gap. Dis:~ppointc:d in the v;e;tkn of the MI ... 
one of the Wali' sons, Amir 2'Lb, decided to bandon the p3n and 
join the PPP. thereby 5erionsl)' splitting the W ll's { mil dullD. \t 
tlu: same time. wat h2d been redistricted so dut Lo"er wat, the 
:.t of the Wali'a 'trcngth, was dhidcd from Upper Swat. The Wali'a 
l\\"0 som. mir Zeb and Aur.mgzcb, "~occupied in 'tru ling \\ith 
one nothC'r lor master) in ~cr wat. Jetning the political raeld in 
tht North to the 'lahmat l:hl") and the Pl'l' du/ID. 
Aakl from the machinations of the traditional Jeadcnhip, a new 
clt'ment had hegltn co make iueH felt in Sw ti politic. p.utly u a tt-
ull or the policio of the natjonal go,-emrnen[. ' J his new clement was 
tht poor and huullc.u, who began tali11g nn acthc unci t~el£-irlteroted 
role in politic for U\C fir t time, prodMd l1y JC\Cr ul PI,P measures !or 
social rdonn. One measure \\lll the rno\c.mcnt tmY'nrd redbtribution 
or land. •1 hb program, which rteei\'cd great puulicity, lutd almcnt no 
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the PPP message that proclaimed that the poor should oppose the land-
lords. In this way a new foTCe was unleashed in the political field. From 
a society dominated by the YerticaJ splits o( the dulla ~)'Stem. with tu.ls 
lining up bclUnd their Khan overlords to fight other tuls of similar 
compositjon, Swat moved toward a polity or horizomal cleavages and 
class confliCL 
In response to this threat to the S)'Stem, the traditional appeal to 
religion was made. In the 1970 elections in Swat, the Jumiat-i·Uiema-i-
lslam pany (JUJ) had been a minor £actor. With the defeat of the 
Palhtun aTm}' in 1897 by tbe British in Malaltand and the secularir.a-
tion or the family of Saiclu Baba into the autocracy of the Badshab, 
;religion had become unimportant in Swari politics. But with the threat 
offered by the PPP program and the rising consciousness o[ the poor. 
the religious party again became significant. 
As ·we ha,•e seen, the rise of religiOta leadership in times o£ srress 
on the systt!m has long been a trait o£ the Swati segmentary society. But, 
where previously the enemy wa~ an imader, in the pre.<~ent ca~e the 
enemy was within-i.e., the slowly developing self-awareness of the 
poor and the cons,cquent weakening of the old social order. In Swat. 
therefore. Islam was equ:Hed with tradition:~! interem. ~bny landlo.-ds 
suddenly grew beards as a tokt!n oE piety and began consulting their 
imams as they hec1me more aware of the PPP threat. ln return, the 
Islam preached by JUI mullah~ rtnd irTUims repeatedly ~tressed the 
sanctity o£ private property and the need Cor :.ttict punishment of the 
impious. The problem of poverty was left to the good wnt of the 
wealthy. 
The Mahtn.ilt khel dulla, as opponents of the PPP, welcomed the 
religious clements within their party. The leader of the imams, Mullah 
MauJana Abdul Rahman, was acrepted by the Mahmat khel as co-
kader of their party. The Mahmat kbel party was thus internally di-
vided into the secular National Democratic Pal'ty (NDP) wing, headed 
by Alam Khan (the NDP was successor to the outlawed • AP), and 
the J UJ faction headed by 1\taulana Abdul Rahman. 
In t'arlier days, the advent of a religious leader onto the political 
field would have meant that the Pakhtun would forget their dilferences 
and unite against a common enemy. However, this response did not 
occur in the modern case, for sev~ral r<!asons. ln th~ first place, the roe 
was not :m external invader, but rather the internal dufln o£ D~t 
Mohamm:td and Fl"teh Mohamm:td and th~r followers, who included 
many of the newly politici7ed poor. The appeal for unity to protect 
lslam had no ,1ppeal for th~ PPP p:trty, who ~aw it :u a ploy ro bring 
them under Mahmat lc.hel domination. Furthermore, the cry for a 
jihad (religious crusade) against the Sp<!Ctte of socialism was gy-eeted 
with skeptiC'i~m by many Pakhtun, who rt!membererl the u ickery of 
the supposedly religious family of the Bad~hah. Long experience of 
politics played for purely secular goals led many Pakhtun lo reg;uU 
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effect in wat because or the relathrel~ mWl holdings of e'\"eD the big-
l landlords. Bur, as prop3ganth. tlm policy terrified the Palltun-
~ho round their identity in their rights ItO land nd imultaneously 
cncour.aged ri in,g c:xptttatioru :amon the poor. 
More imponant perhaps ~-as a new emphasis on tenam righu and 
an end to compulsory labor. This truck 1 the hour of the traditional 
I) tern by cha11<.-nging the absolute rjghts o( landlords 0\Cr their de-
pcndenu. 1 hese rules had their mou dra:nutk effects in lhe highland 
arc:u, 'llihere •he Gujar serfs were scallercd in i\ol ted homesiC:ad..\, fu 
from their \"DIIey-dwclling o\erlords. Spar~td by the J'PP tenancy 
policy, thoc Cujars organiled thonsei\C$ agttinst their 1. ndlonls and 
claimed the land as their own. Pitched batllcs 'lliC:rc fought, and the 
Gujars held their own, killing $Orne P.1khrun in the fighting. 
In the ""itler 10\l:land \"alleys, whet e the landlorcb were near 
nci hbors of rheir tenants, resistance did not reach the organized h~.,·rl 
round in dte hiiU. Nftnelheleu. di.stontent '~ hh tl-U! olcl f)'ltcm w21 
nrc. he new tenancy b\\"S were seen lin these densely populated r~ 
ons go,-unmenr naion to ruin C\ iction from homes llild l.uKL 
rle\iously, the landlords had absolute rights to disposscu a tenant. 
but prttmption lat~."S no\'' offered tlae tenant net protection. PPP 
promul tion of~ roles \\on the p;~n the lo "lh) of man~ of the 
lo b.nd poor. 
11te policie. of the PPP, whHe important. \\'Cte, in a rue. :Umpl) 
recognitions of a process alread) inherent in the economil tr:truforma-
tion of wat. The introduction of a money ec-onom) in the \'alley had 
Ire tly lt.'ld C\ :rnl e!Tects that tended to loo eu the tr:ulitional bonds 
tying th • dient to his patron lanrllord. Mitchin• ry bcgnn to replace 
the lnborcr in tlle fields :and the lanulou.ls no longer hlrtl tire physical 
IJt'CCI IO m.tirtt tin a l:trgc work roru!. l'unheunorc, the inllOlluction of 
crul1 Clapping o£ lruit, e~cially :lpple!. :llho greatly 'ut the need £or 
\lo'Orken. as voell as n:dudng the amount of gr:tin a\ "lable to feed them. 
.. rhc introeluction of a modem ma.rk.ct also meant that man~ new pro-
ducu wac a\-ailable, some of \\bich eliminated the need for tnd.ilion.;d 
pecblisu. wch as the pouer and 'lliO\"Cr. imuh neousl , the ash 
cconom brou ht new luxul") goods into \\-at. 1"o firunce the pur~ 
of th pt tige goods. the landlords w~c inclined to reduce or elimi-
nate traditional p:!)'lDenu of their surplu produCJe to their dicnu in 
fll\'nr of lling the surplus for cash. Ceremonies that formerl) required 
a numbtr or dependmu in nttcudance ·wtre performed prl\"lltely by 
the I. ndlord' famjl). and the dependents dbpen d ''ith. 1-"inally, 
imt~d uf ccepting trnciitional tCCOtnpCtt (rom thcir dienLS, the 
l:mdlords tendoo to demand cash rents. 
,\11 of these factorr; indicated a t1cnd towatd 1he reduction of the 
I ndlonJ'o reliance on a number of depc.ndcrm and rationali1ation 
of the pn:..,iously 'Cl'}' personal loyalty or p:uron and dicnt ~mo a 
purely monetary relation. ,1tc client was ncrn mentally prep:ned for 
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the reLigious leaders either as tools of the Mahmat khel (I< else m~ &eli· 
inlet'ested men out for the rewards of power. 
Ideology played little part in lhe lining up of the parties. Al· 
though approximately half the landlords were in lhe PPP party. it 
is fair to say that almost all or them opposed lhe ppp polici~ toward 
the poor. In fact, one of the Jil~t potent arguments used to convince 
landlords to join the PPP was that the land o{ PPP stalwarts would be 
safe from redistribution. Dost Mo-hammad's membership in the PPP 
dcriv~d from his realization that the esublished panics oliercd him 
no room for leadership. Feteh Mohammad's position was equalJy prag· 
matic. Nonetheless, in public pronouncements, the PPP leadcnhip 
were obliged to use PPP rhetoric. 
But, altl1ough most landlordso opposed the PPP program, a Ccw 
younger, better educated. and relati,:el)· poor Pakhtun, who h3d felt 
the squeeze of inflation and who were eager lO become leaden in their 
own right, began to claim that they too were memben of the poor 
classes. Their education had nor allowed them much incr~ase in wealth 
or po-wer, while at the same time it had given them a cert:Un sense of 
guilt over the cruelties of lheir oppressive foreF:ul1ers. Dissatisfaction, 
guilt, and the hope that PPP membership might le:ld to their own 
elevation mingled in the attitudes of these } oung elite men, who ac· 
tively propagandized the PPP program, who occa~ionally called for 
"cutting the throats of the rich," and who .stmggkd to build up pet'· 
sonal followin~ of poor people. The poor. though openly quical 
about the motives of the landlords ·who had actively joined them, never· 
theless were happy to let them domint'lte com·enations, call met:tings, 
and make strategic deci~ions. Long habiu of obedience. coupled with a 
realistic respect for the ubiquitous power nnd the educational training 
of the landlord elite, combined to keep the poor in the x·olc of p:ush•e 
followers. Yet. the fact that some hndlord!l felt obliged, for whatn•er 
reasoll$, to actively identify themsehe:; wi.t.h their menials and not the 
converse was an unprecedemed developmem in Swali politics. This 
development structural!)• countered the retrograde motion implicit in 
the rise o£ the JUl. 
As in 1970. Lhe 1977 elections provided a. yardstic~ for analy1ing 
political change and continuity in Swat. The new party of the PPP 
actually consim·d of the reformed dul/11 of .KJun Badhur, but lacked 
the 5upport of the Wali who had ltept Khan lbdhur in power. Rather 
than looking to the ·\!Vali, the party looked to the n:ttion:tl government 
{or patronage and lO the poor, who were taking p:ut in politics for the 
first time, as a class. The ~bhmat khcl, filling theiJ traditional role 
as opponents of Khan Badbur's duUa, r:tn under the NDP banner o! 
the People's National Alliance (PNA). Their part} w.1s joined by the 
.stanat.1ar or religious class, which, under the JUI label. sought to TC· 
capture the customary political dominance once held by r.hc stanadar 
lluring tirn~s. of war. 
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The camp ign had two paru: the public and the pri\-ate. The 
prhate campaign '~ • traditional as the dullas lined up upport on the 
basis o! long-stamling allianc~ nnd enmitie~. lf one's larbrtr were 
P.NA. then it wns n mmed one lvouhl join the PPP. '1 he lohmnt khel. 
~iLh their large tractS of land, reminded their tenant th:u £avorable 
rent rates depended on a PNA liCIOI]. and rl1e PI'P landlords did 
Jikel\i~. 
"1m public e~mp:Ugn rnnducted through ~du~s and prop1-
ganda. The p2nphcrnalia of posters, na , and hats ''ere in evidmcr. 
Flag railing rcrcmonies, in ~hid1 people declared their loyalty to a 
part} and g:nc n £east. were major occasions. Dost Mohnmmad and 
f:aulana Abdul Rahman ga\e pcedtcs themselves, but fctelt foham-
m;td and Alnm Khan delegated fie.ry )oung Khan me.n to speak far 
them. The PPP spc.:aters resscd dte historical avaridoumm of the 
fahmat khcl, the national power or Lhe PPP anti its commitment to 
reform and the desuuction or fahrruu khel dominion, and the likeli-
hood or spoil. The PN' h.·uangues TC\Oht'd 8t0UIId the immonlilV 
nr t.Ocialilm, rhe r Sl sins of lKh n B dhur, the ponibllh th:n a ppp 
\iflory would m~. 11 nn end of the \"Cil !or women. aru.J th!! re:.r or Jand 
reform. 
The rhetoric and argument 'u~re nalagous to the p uern or rlle 
S" l political tructure, combining cu tom ''ith no\ell • FOT most 
of the elite. ideo I om; and discu ton ~-ere irrele\'ant, since they followed 
thrir ancient dulla tem. alignin in t their tarbur. But the na-
tional policies of tl1• PPP, in tandem ,;th the tnm (onnin"' effects oi 
a money cronomy, had :altered the parameter! o( the contest. No one 
could nnr longer he tompletcly cerrnin how the dicnt popul:u.ion 
would rcilct, rhnugh both p:u tics made arrangement~ to rocrre rlle 
poor anti rig th~ \Oil'! lin their areas or tren~lh. 
In the Nation I A!scmbl clerliou held on larch 7, 1977, Fetclt 
foha.nunad Khan ,.,:on a comincing "iaory over his opponent, [au-
lana Abdul Rahman. The final result, ~tb about half the approxi· 
mately one hundred thousand \'O'tts nc:tu:ally t"'tin :-a~ 26,907 far 
Fetch tohammad, 21, 92 Cor bdul Rahman. Roth id had at· 
tempted to Cln')' rhe <'lection b? c.hkanery and \'llrions ubte.r:fuges, 
ami both were uncssful in thctr respecti\·e ~trongholds. But in the 
neutral nra~. ll:here the trrn rh or the landowning Jlics or r.he 
fahmat khel and the PPP were equ:tl and whtte force could not be 
easily wM on the \'Otcn, the PPr \Ole was 'CfJ high r rticul:u-1 
important wa rlte Gujar \Ote of rhc hilly polling stations, hich was 
mcrwhclmingJ) for tlu: PPP. n jmportant faaor tlut o kcned the 
PNA \'Ote wu the JUI deci ion to keep their \\Omen from the polls 
as a mark of TCJigtous pitt}. 
A~ ror the Pakhtun themseh • n fUd) of the ICSUits lhows their 
vote was plit equally, in keeping \\ith the tradition orb lance between 
dulla. With the P khtun \Ole n tin itself and \\ith the poor voting 
for the PPP, the PNA'& onl) hope rested with the stancdar. Dut ~ 
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sttmadar in regions dominated b PPP Pakhturu "':otc:d PPP, ' bile 
the remainder \\:tt~ not numerous enou h to offset the \otes or the 
poor. 
ftcr the Marchi election, \b.ic:h the PNA lost nationall ·.though 
the part dominated in the J rwFP, the P~ national 1eadmhip de-
dutd a OO)COlt of the FO" incial elections and be n a protest program 
of trikes and marches. Thou h there "'ere 'iolent confrontations be-
t' cc:n tlle P. 'A and ppp rouo~eD in mDn) puts or Pakismn. prott"~ts 
\\rre 1 el.llh d)• mild in Swnt. The 1 en son fur the unexpected calm in 
the nOIII1:Jlly violent ,·alley .,..,.~ the fl':tt lJ · both p01rties that fighting 
\\·oultl ncli .. ·ale the segmentary systern of nlli:'tnctll, o'crriding Lhe patty 
orgnniz.at.ion and uniting f.tmilics for \enge.mcc regardleu o£ p:my 
affiliation. 
E.-,;tended agitation in the nation n I the inabilil) o( t.he PPP 
ttntml government to curb it had a cliah artening effe-ct on the rrr 
in Swat, "I he Pa.khtun of the PPP part a umed that the P.:aliliumi 
state, like the British Raj, was ll·po,,c:rful, nnd could not undentand 
iu impotenre. The PPP men \lierc moment ril cheered wbm a num-
ber of ntigm~ent demonstrators c:re killed in I.;ahore. This 
the response they furl expected from the &0\'ttttmem. But. t~.ilen t 
killing~ \\c:re not repeated, many of the l'a htun began to Change 'des. 
Others, whose hatred and far of the Mahmat thcl tept them lrom 
.biCting dulln, ronside:r-ed rounding tltcir O\lin, independent panics. 
While the ?\bhm."lt lthet org:ullrcd march .md 5trikes and the 
imtzms m ttle inflammatOf)' ipctrhes, the Pl'l• Je den made dhergent 
tapon~. Don Moh:tmmad, who'IC £or111ncs were romplctdy lied to 
the rPP, ta)cd in the public c e s he II ie\1 to rally his (ol!O\\CJ'1. 
Feteh Mohammad, who rontrOIJect hi own locally b.:a.sro parn. rc-
maindl ilentJy :n honte, watching for the direction of the politioal 
brec:te. ' it brcame e'ident that the Pl'l' centnll go\'ertlment ' ould 
not u ccM in mpp ing the 1'. 'A uite l'cteh lollammad's 
brother unex(M"ctedly dedued l1is intention tct rnn u an independent 
candidate llgllimt Dost fohamnud \\hene-.-er the Provindal elections 
-.-ere held. fetdl fotwnmad claimed to be un:able to dissuade hi 
brother from this course. but obscr\cn beliCl"ed he ·:as scaell en~ 
counging his brother witl1 n qe to in tbtin himself again with the 
b.hmat tbcl. 
11 manipulation \'ere cut mort \\Jhen the he:ad o( the Pakil-
~nni ann , Central Zia, declared manbl l:tu in Pakistan. The fcdin 
among all the factiotu in Upper ~Wilt '' rl"lie£ that d ngerou.- party 
wran •lin~ had lx.-en settled by inttn-cmion rrom •boH!. De£initionally. 
the scgtncnury S) tem IICe<h a mroi 101' in times o£ di,J>Ule, and \\C 
h:ave n how the mediating bOO)· Juu C\ohed from the relati\-cly 
Wl~k ..rtanadar!l into a CCllttalizecJ lmreauc:rncy, 1\111 "·e ha\'C abo ICC1l 
tl1at the dullas of Swat retained their tendenC) 10 tefonn and dis~nse 
~ith th mec.liator·lcader lifter the cd is. The 1\;ul hah onJ) managed 
to maintain his central po ilion with the h lp of the culoni~ power 
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and, later, \\ith the aid or President A ~b. 8 · the end or fieldwork in 
J9ii, the Pakhtun \\eR alJCdy Chafing under the manial law ad-
mlniuration and dem..1nding return to independence and the old 
dullt:: disputes. If the mntial Ia"' rule is to continue in wat. its bad-
in,g mu t be as 5trong as that given to the .lbdwh. One f:laor in bvor 
of the preso Vlltion or the martial Jaw ndminist ti«JI1 is that the ai.sis 
that g:nc rise to h. imohing as it docs a 1r:1n funn. tion of the :i)~lcm 
rnther than a mere atad: upon it, lhre:ucns 10 be perm nem, both 
loaa11y in Swat and nationall). 
Conclusion 
'This essay h:ts attempted to demonstrate that, tltrough the politi-
cal C\olution of Sw111. ceruain paucm ha"e persisted. Among the elite, 
the dulln 6)Jtem and the scgmcnUlt') linc:tge principles ha\e neftT 
~Cit 6upcnetled. though t.hcry we~ uppro.scd for a hort time under 
lit Jladshah and, more recently, under them rt.i II w dministration. 
People continued to be made and broken on the b:nis of IDTburwali, 
the hostilit) of the wns of brothen. This impli that the closest rela-
u~ and allies are the mo t lik I) tr.aitoa and t1 1 m••trust and be-
C111) I re pen-ash-e. Within this troaure oCh sndh idual sees him-
self in a p ny not broausc of an) sense of ideo! ·all commitment, but 
•imply beoau~e his tnulitional enemy is io the opposite camp. ""I"M 
cg:llil.ari:mi5m and absence o£ well-defined hierarchy \\ithin a pany 
rne: ns th 1 politics ron • u of Ouid, indhidualistic. e•ju:tll} balanced 
co:~lition of t'lite who hne no program bqunu elf-protection and 
beH :tg$,rrandi1emem. 
'J hi!l rradhionnl p:aucrn has ~en altercu in rope nud goal$ by 
ICVCI tl l:mon. An num:tndlng chnnge i rei. ICiJ to &he rise o£ cl~~ 
:t\\ 1renw among the poor, which 11.'15 been countcn:d by the resurgcnre 
of the !felfgiou~ class as a politirnl Coree. The dulla ttempted to deal 
\\iLh the dtan~ by incorporating the no\-cl elements. the PPP by 
takin" In the poor and the PNA the l'eligiow. Tht incorpor:ation may 
pnm: di rupti\-e of the dulln S)Jtem. The part l~dcn, though only 
interested in pr2gtn3tic uctia of gaining po er, found thcmselvt:S 
obliged to deal it.h hwes of ideo!ogy and forced to m~l:.e pronounce-
ments on the problems of a napldl) ch.angin socict). lthough the 
leaden senerally dud;ed these contro' i:al topirs and \\orkcd along 
cullom ry Jinet. a Jlrecedent was et when some ~oung Khans irlentified 
thenu hcs ~ith the poor and '~hen :m imMn act:hr.l) emt"''Cd politics 
u 11 mdidntc. In this alignment we Ina)' I~ it.!y ( pmcntimcm 
ol th future. 
Another umeuling factor has been the c.xpt!rit!nr..c of thr. alnolutc 
JK>wer of the B dshah and Khan lladhur auclthe C\en grc ter po\\cr of 
the mu.ional gmemment in unmddug th e despou. Prior ro the 
n <Wtah, the political game, though Cull or bloodshed, alw )I ended in 
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a 5undoff. The indhidu:U's gc»1 could onl) be che respl'Ct and honor 
ghm to a ulented and rutbl pb)er. But after lhe Badshah lhe 
JJlayas s:~w tlut absolute power \1: s tt inable \\ith the aid of a ~n­
cral nate. Holding web pot\'tt became the ideal of th~ pla1en and 
polidcal rivalry assumed a mote seriou tone. Whereas PJ"C\ iowl) .it 
had ba-n assumed that the S)'ltem \l:ould nlways right itself ~nd the 
pnties ~.-ould alwa~ exist, in 1977 it wu ft>ared tlut the de!eatm party 
would be utterly dcstro)ed. Thi.1 fe r c:oounted for the inll"an igcncy 
of the PNA in S\\1lt and, pethnp, iu the 1t te of Pakistan in gencn.l. 
The U3UC problem then U thllt of de\cJoping a democratic;, ClCO• 
lrllli1Cd l!HC upon the found.ttion o( 8 local egmcntary S}'ltetn tllllt 
hu n irs premises indi,idunliun, ucachery. equalitr. and balance. 
The problem an onl)' be rcsohed by the C\Oiution of cla~s allianca 
to replace the ftuid but ultimately uiioauing pattern of .aegment.ary 
aodety. This solution is nnlicipatetl in the rowiu of the poor as a 
dus ami the religious rcactinnari thcir opponents. Un!onun:ucl). 
the contradictions invohed in t11e t"Onfront dons between these t"o 
elemml.l "·en: wch in 19i7 c.lut 'ioleru rupture \\"aS only n'ttted by 
the imposition o£ a national rlictatonhip 1h2l ruppresscd party stt~ire. 
~ ' bilties Cor a peaceful s<JCial trans(cmi12tion appeared slim indeed 
\\ithin the ltructure outlined abo'e. 
CIIAltU:: IJ ~1>110LM reantly reed~ lilt J'b.n . £rom lhc Dcpznmall ol Anthro-
pology al CA!umbta Uah'cnlty for hit wmlln wat. 
